Friday, April 13, 2012

In Praise of Punctuality (... or Why I'm Not an Optimist)

We'll, I can't say I didn't ask for it. When you title your book The Coming Prosperity, you can expect to be called an "optimist" at minimum--even "Dr. Boom" or the "Permabull."
You also can't be surprised at a bit of reflexive skepticism, as evidenced by this announcement of a talk I'm giving on April 18 at Artisphere in Arlington, VA: "With a title like that, one should expect some 'happy talk...'"
Fine. But, just for the record, I don't see my book as being optimistic, nor do I regard myself personally as "an optimist." Why not?

Monday, April 2, 2012

Reconciling The Coming Prosperity with the Great Stagnation: Excerpt from my Interview with Richard Florida

Richard Florida and I have been friends, and at times colleagues, since the late 1990s. He was insightful and articulate back then, as he is now. Back when Richard first started working on the "three Ts"--talent, technology, and tolerance--he was just about the only economist seriously looking at the role of creative individuals in driving the development of regions and nations. That's changed ... though, as the continued fixation with industrial policy and clusters indicates, the technocratic tendency is still to relegate actual human beings to the footnotes.
Richard generously offered to write a blurb for The Coming Prosperity. A couple of weeks ago he interviewed me about the book, and posted the exchange to Atlantic Cities. Richard's questions were great. Here's an except that gave me that chance to reconcile my view of the next quarter century with the seemingly opposite view offered by my George Mason University colleague Tyler Cowen in his Spring 2011 bestseller, The Great Stagnation:
Why specifically do you disagree with economists and others who believe that we are entering an age of prolonged stagnation and decline?

Sunday, April 1, 2012

Growthology: The Neutron Book?

On Friday I posted a review of Acemoglu and Robinson's new book, Why Nations Fail to the Kauffman Foundation's Growthology blog:

Growthology: The Neutron Book?: "The advertised central thesis of the book (in contrast with what I think is the core idea in the book) is introduced a bit later, on page 42, when the authors state:
Economic institutions shape economic incentives… It is the political process that determines what economic institutions people live under, and it is the political institutions that determine how this process works… As institutions influence behavior and incentives in real life, they forge the success and failure of nations.
Institutions shape behavior, so institutions matter. Politics shapes institutions, so politics matters.

From that point forward, Why Nations Fail alternates awkwardly between lively storytelling and frequently unpersuasive attempts to shoehorn narrative nuance into conformity with The Point of the Book.

... As it stands, Why Nations Fail comes close to being a neutron book. It describes wondrous worlds full of clever people after then, after the detonation of The Point of the Book, leaves only the buildings standing... The people: gone."

Bottom line: Great (narrative) content, weak (conceptual) packaging.

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Taking the Scare out of Scarcity

Review of Peter Diamandis and Steven Kotler, Abundance: The Future is Better than You Think, New York: Free Press, 2012.

The human community occupies a planet of finite resources. As population grows, people and nations will necessarily compete with increasing ferocity. Scarcity-driven crises will provoke dramatic oscillations in human welfare, leading almost inevitably to a collapse of civilization.

Got that?

Welcome to the world of the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, author of An Essay on the Principle of Population. The core thesis of Malthus’s 1798 masterwork is neatly summarized in a line early in the book: “The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.” 

The logic behind the argument advanced by Malthus was compelling. For over two centuries  An Essay on the Principle of Population has not only been studied, but has been endlessly copied and revived in various forms. Early twentieth century eugenicists employed Malthusian arguments to justify inhuman controls on the reproductive freedoms of other people ... and worse. Malthusian fears came back in a widely read book by Paul and Anne Ehrlich published in 1968 and titled The Population Bomb; the Ehrlich's message was updated as recently as 2010 in a lead essay in Foreign Affairs titled "The New Population Bomb."  Woven throughout this two-centuries old body of work is a single unifying theme: the reproductive power of people is a paramount problem for society as a whole. Beware the future.

So much for the theory of demographic doom. What of the facts?

Monday, January 30, 2012

Collaborative Advantage

Here's the video from a panel I moderated at the launch event for Global Entrepreneurship Week 2011. The topic of the panel was "Collaborative Advantage: How Diaspora Entrepreneurs Are Creating Connections for Shared Prosperity." The panelists are:


You can decide for yourself after viewing how awesome these folks are. (Hint: Very.)



"Collaborative Advantage" is also the title of chapter 11 of The Coming Prosperity. Here's an excerpt:

Saturday, January 7, 2012

The Coming Prosperity (cover)

In case you were wondering...

Fear Itself

From chapter 13 of The Coming Prosperity (forthcoming from Oxford University Press, March 2012)

Among the items in the back of the hardware store, right next to the lime, is ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is good as fertilizer; it’s also pretty good for making explosives. In fact, regular old agricultural fertilizer was the operative ingredient for the bomb used in the 4/19 attacks. Doesn't ring a bell? That was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995. It killed 168 people. At the time it was the most severe terrorist attack on US soil.

Of course, the Oklahoma City bombing isn’t forgotten. But it’s not exactly remembered, either. Now, granted, the toll from the attack on the Murrah Building was about 5 percent of the toll from the destruction of
the World Trade Center towers. And the Oklahoma City bombing wasn’t broadcast live on TV, it didn’t involve a pair of national landmarks (I’m including the Pentagon, which as you recall was also attacked on 9/11), and it didn’t result in $30 billion in insured losses.

That said, would we remember the 4/19 attacks in the same way if they had been carried out by a posse of Koran-thumping extremists rather than a couple of homegrown ones? Let’s be honest: despite (or perhaps due to) the fact that domestic groups have perpetrated the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks in the US, head scarves make more of an impression than baseball caps on the cable news feed. At the end of the day, the story behind the Oklahoma City attacks just didn’t sell—politically or otherwise. Terrorist attacks perpetrated by self-proclaimed ultrapatriots from the Midwest—well, they must be an aberration. The attackers? Dumbed-down Unabombers. No real information there. Just noise.

But how about this, from former Senator Rick Santorum in 2006: “In World War II we fought Nazism and Japanese imperialism. Today, we are fighting against Islamic fascism.” Now that’s more like it. From that eloquent starting point, security screamers can cut and paste the usual language of external menace. Our very way of life is at risk. The line is drawn. The struggle against terrorism is equivalent to World War III. And so forth.

What does any of this have to do with reality? Not much. Comparisons of Islamic fundamentalism to fascism in the 1930s or communism in the 1950s may have sounded good from the podium over the past decade, but they areare almost entirely empty when considered from both economic and historical standpoints. Germany in 1930 was a country with demonstrated capacity as a global economic leader whose steady development had been halted at the start of the twentieth century only when the Treaty of Versailles brought a pointless war to its conclusion through a bankrupting peace. Even Japan, greatly underestimated in the West before it attacked Pearl Harbor, had steadily built its economic foundation and technical capabilities over a period of almost a century by patiently investing and strategically imitating Western techniques. Even in a worst-case scenario (much worse for the countries affected than for us) the countries that might conceivably be susceptible to the sway of Islamic fundamentalist ideologues today do not even have the economic capability of the Soviet Union in the 1950s; they do not compare at all with Germany or Japan of the 1930s.

Of course, innovation and technical change have also created new modes of attack that make small groups potentially threatening today in a way that only an entire nation could have been threatening in the past. But a historical perspective is valuable here, as well. Consider that, worldwide, over sixty million people lost their lives during World War II. Among armed combatants, the United States could count itself lucky in having lost only 290,000 of its sixteen million service members. Such losses are inconceivable today in the context of an attack by a terrorist adversary, touting Islamic fundamentalist ideology or not—even when we consider the truly nightmarish scenario of nuclear attack. Yet even eight decades ago, the democratic institutions, including the decentralized markets, had a remarkable capacity to adapt and respond following World War II. For what reason might we believe that capitalism and democracy are any more fragile today than they were back then? By what measure can any present threat, posed by even the most malicious nonstate adversaries, compare with the combined industrial might demonstrated by the German, Japan, and other Axis powers during World War II, or by the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War? Our respect for the capabilities of foes and our recognition of the reality of potential threats must be matched with an equally realistic appraisal of our society’s resilience and capacity for recovery.

The simple reality is this: terrorists of various types exist, they are dangerous, and they will almost certainly be responsible for further deaths of innocents in the United States and elsewhere in the world in coming decades. But there is basically zero prospect that such attacks will alter the forward trajectory of global history—unless, of course, political leaders dramatically increase their impacts through exaggerated responses.

Sunday, December 11, 2011

Sunday, October 23, 2011

The Population Boon

I did a phone interview last week with Josh Landis from CBS News Sunday on the topic of the world at 7 billion. Josh and his "The Fast Draw" partner Mitch Butler drew from the interview in putting together a nice short segment (2:18) that aired today:



More people solve more problems: a core theme of The Coming Prosperity.

Friday, October 14, 2011

I come to bury industrial policy, not to praise it (pt II—Rodrik)

[continuing from previous post "I come to bury industrial policy, not to praise it (pt I)"]

... Now on to Dani Rodrik's contribution to the 2010 The Economist debate concerning industrial policy. Rodrik's role was to argue against the following motion:
"This house believes that industrial policy always fails." 
Rodrik begins his argument by pointing out—correctly—that there is, in a technical sense, no way he can lose. "... always fails"? Give me a break. How could an idea tried repeatedly over the period of decades in much of the world have "always" failed? All that's required to win the debate is to find a single success. I pointed out one in my previous post. So he's won the debate before he even gets started.

But then, unfortunately for his case, Rodrik goes further.

I come to bury industrial policy, not to praise it (pt I—Lerner)

A recent  renewal of public discussion regarding the virtues of industrial policy, juxtaposed against the ongoing Solyndra spectacle, prompted me the other day to revisit an Economist debate from last year between Josh Lerner and Dani Rodrik. The debate was on the following motion:
"This house believes that industrial policy always fails." 
Lerner, whose expertise is mostly in rich country (US & Europe) innovation policy, argued for the motion; Rodrik, a development economist, argued against.

This Lerner-Rodrik debate is worth revisiting for two reasons. First, Lerner and Rodrik are exceptional intellects with imposing publication records, debating an important topic. Second—most entertainingly for me as the guy in the bleacher seats—they both manage to be wrong, in spite of having ostensibly staked out opposing positions.

Let's start with Lerner.

Thursday, October 13, 2011

You Get What You Celebrate

Carl Schramm has a post on Forbes.com titled "Remembering Steve Jobs By Celebrating The Life He Lived":
Here’s what President Obama said in January 2009 to the million people on the National Mall who gathered to celebrate his inauguration: “It has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things—some celebrated, but more often men and women obscure in their labor—who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.” Steve Jobs, whose loss we mourn, was one such risk-taker, doer, and maker of things. His life represents the best of what America has to offer. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are at the heart of our national narrative. We owe it to Steve Jobs—and to the thousands of inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs whose daily efforts are keeping America not only in the game, but on the frontier of global progress—to put the celebration of entrepreneurship and innovation at center stage in the nation’s capital. Not just on inauguration day, but  every day. 
Here is a proposal: Why not bring the excitement of entrepreneurship and innovation to the National Mall and share it with the more than 30 million people from around the United States, and the world, who visit there every year? We’re not talking about a hands-on science center. We are talking about an Apple-worthy festival of design and ingenuity. A mind-blowing food court of the imagination. A permanent celebration of the living spirit of America’s greatest entrepreneurs and innovators, open and available to all... (more here)
As I recently posted on this opportunity myself, you'll know that I agree with Carl. This isn't just a building. Its an opportunity to make a national statement of historic proportions.

For consumers the rule may be, "you get what you pay for." For nations, it's ultimately "you get what you celebrate."

Who decides? The Secretary of the Smithsonian, who in turn is accountable to the Smithsonian's Board of Regents and the members of the Committee on House Administration. Just FYI. More to follow.

@makersonthemall
@innovateonmall
innovationonthemall.org

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Maker Faire is Awesome

Here are a few videos I took at Marker Faire New York the weekend before last:





The Kauffman Foundation has put together this video with clips from Maker Faire Kansas City (slightly higher production value here):


I could go on at great length about why I think this is important. (Tween kid overhead saying to Dad: "We are soooo coming back here next year!") But Tom Kalil's already done a good job of that. And, anyhow, where would I start?. "Maker Faire is integrative..."? "Maker Faire is open-ended..."? "Maker Faire is essential for..."? Sure. Yadda yadda. But the bottom line? Simple.

Maker Faire is awesome.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Regional Ecologies of Innovation

I wrote this piece with Lewis Branscomb and Richard Zeckhauser in 2001. As it was part of a grant application, it was never published. The topic of innovation ecosystems keeps coming up (e.g. here), so it seems worth posting. More on related themes here, here, here, here, and here.

The problem of regional imbalances in technology-based innovation is hugely important.[1] Standard approaches to this problem tend to assume that technology-based innovation and resultant economic growth will automatically occur if
·         local research institutions are sufficiently strong;
·         the regional concentration of high tech firms is sufficiently high;
·         the regulatory environment is sufficiently favorable to risk capital,
·         political leadership is sufficiently strong.
All of the above "conditions" for regional innovation are necessary, but they are not sufficient. No amount of government support for a nascent venture capital industry will help a region devoid of technology entrepreneurs. A state-funded technology park established near a top research university will house few tenants if the university discourages faculty from seeking to commercialize their innovations. An isolated cluster of heavily subsidized start-up firms constitutes an innovation ecosystem no more than an assemblage of parrots and potted ferns is a rainforest.

Private sector actors in the innovation system, informed policy makers, and academics all know that, to paraphrase [former House speaker] Tip O’Neil about politics with modest hypebole, “all innovation is local.” However, the more specific questions that engage policy makers lie beyond our current state of knowledge:
  • Where an innovation-based economy does exist, how does government act (or refrain from acting) to support its continued growth? Where one does not exist, what can be done to encourage one to develop?
  •  What are the critical links in the innovation network? What opportunities, if any, exist for partnerships between governmental bodies operating at different scales or in neighboring jurisdictions and various actors in the innovation system? What should be the roles of local, state, and federal governments in supporting innovation?
  • In an ideal world, what programs should local, state, and federal government fund, how much should the programs receive, and how should their success be measured?
A better understanding of regional innovation, and thus better public policy and program design, depends on being able to answer the follow questions:
  • What fundamental set of behaviors, contracts and incentives characterizes the “regional ecology of innovation”? By what processes are basic scientific breakthroughs translated into commercializable products and processes? What of incremental improvements to products and processes?
  • In innovation ecosystems, how do networks of relationships and trust form? What are their limitations of scale and scope (e.g. geographical scope, number of names in the "Rolodex," qualitative variety of contacts)?
  •  How do the local, state, and federal governments engage in the innovation system, positively and negatively? What kinds of policies and programs at each scale of government best support currently thriving innovation ecosystems, and which best nurture the development of new ones?
  • To what extent is regional specialization—e.g., the development of regional technology “clusters”—truly a requirement for successful competition in global markets for knowledge-based goods and services? Does regional specialization increase the likelihood of capturing economic gains from innovations locally? In an era when technologies, products, and services are increasingly developed upon shared platforms, with networks of research centers, suppliers, and customers linked in complex ways across industry boundaries, are clusters less important? How relevant today are assumed boundaries between ‘traditional’ economic activities (e.g. textiles, fishing, and agriculture) and new, technology-based industry areas considering, for example, advances in robotics and ag-biotech? How do new technologies provide p remote regions overcome traditional limitation in the digital economy, given new technologies?[2]
We use the terms “ecology” and “ecosystem” metaphorically. At the same time, we recognize that the project may benefit from exploring further the insights for human systems of research by leading ecologists and evolutionary biologists (see e.g. Levin 1992). The use of evolutionary and ecological metaphors in economics has a long history in economics, dating back at least to Marshall (1890). Yet natural system differ from human social systems in fundamentals respects.

Technology-based innovation and economic growth
In the 1950s and 1960s many economic models informing public policy assumed that basic science (and spinoffs from military R&D) “automatically” led to productivity and market growth.[3] However most industrial innovation is based on modest extensions of existing technology, so most productivity gains result neither from advances in basic science nor from radical new technologies, but rather from steady improvements to existing innovations. During the 1980s, Japanese success in the high tech industries in which U.S. firms had been dominant were finally understood as a failure of domestic firms to adequately prioritize manufacturing efficiency and consumer satisfaction.[4]  In the 1990s the U.S. economy surged. Growth derived fundamentally from a dramatic increase in productivity. While the sources of these productivity gains are debated among economists,[5] most attribute a substantial part of this growth in real terms to the surge in the creation of entrepreneurial, venture capital-backed, technology firms.

At the end of the 1990s, perceptions shifted again toward a view that technology-based radical innovations uniquely replenish the economy’s long-term potential—though their short-term contribution to economic growth is relatively minor. The role of technology entrepreneurship in general, and particularly the institution of venture capital, as engines of U.S. economic expansion became almost an article of faith among politicians, pundits, policy-makers and the public. The stampede of investors into, then out of, the public market for equity in technology-based “new economy” firms and the volume of traffic from Silicon Valley to Wall Street came increasingly to represent not just a single economic sector, but rather the scorecard for the economy as a whole.[6]

The actual relationship between innovation and job growth and venture capital investment is a considerably murkier problem than newspaper accounts or stump speeches would suggest.[7] Innovation today is usually the product of many different types of entities working together.  The techno-wizards, perhaps joined by a few others in small start-up efforts, bring their new ideas.  Venture capitalists and angels add their money, their contacts, and their vision of the marketplace.  Strategic partners offer downstream or upstream customers, rapid access to established marketing networks, and swift scalability in manufacture.  Investment bankers proffer the end-of-the-rainbow pots of gold.  Beyond this, universities may provide basic technologies for license, governments key incentives for location, lawyers effective structures to allocate shares and align incentives. Specialization across firm types and corporate boundaries characterizes today's successful high tech firm.  The success of each of these firm types, the metaphorical equivalent of species in an ecosystem, depends on the presence of others.[8] Understanding the detailed characteristics of the processes supporting innovation at a microeconomic level is critical not only to resolving their impacts at the macroeconomic level, but to designing public policy that allow them to function efficiently and equitably.
Technology entrepreneurs in the innovation system: What do we know?
Schumpeter (1912) foreshadowed current discussions, referring to the role of the entrepreneurs in bringing together resources to create “new combinations” of economic activity—ones that occasionally succeeded in challenging incumbent forms of economic activity.[9] At the start of the 21st century, what do we know about the process by which technology entrepreneurs in partnership with venture capitalists, corporate technology managers, university technology licensing officers and others in the innovation system conceive and implement “new combinations”? Though our understanding is fragmentary, we can make some observations:
  • Both technologies and the markets in which they are bought and sold are becoming increasingly complex. Arriving at a detailed understanding of either requires many years of painstaking effort. Yet, having reached the frontier of knowledge regarding a technological area or a market, an innovator cannot rest for long because knowledge depreciates rapidly.[10] Markets exert pressure to standardize and modularize. Complexity on one hand and standardization on the other are thus almost yin and yang forces, the former reinforcing the traditional role of personal contacts, the latter pushing the drive toward impersonal markets.[11]
  • Nearly all new technological applications arise either from incremental change to, or new combinations of existing technologies. Understanding how to combine existing technologies (e.g., the internal combustion engine and the air-foil) to create a new product (e.g., the airplane) requires having some understanding of how each of the technologies works separately. As technologies become more complex, new combinations require collaboration.[12]
  •  The key obstacle to funding a technological collaboration—bringing into existence a new technological and/or economic combination—is the ability to identify the minute subset of potential combinations for which a viable market exists and which matches the skill set of a group of specialized technologists  whose services can be engaged—a task referred to by venture capitalists as “due diligence.”
  • Technology entrepreneurs are not, as a rule, able to carry out this work on their own. To build one’s knowledge base to the point where one is working at or near the technological frontier and to organize a quality research team is a challenging enough job description. Most technology entrepreneurs cannot additionally maintain a venture capital caliber network of business contacts.
  • Quality venture capitalists and angel investors must be able to evaluate the quality of new combinations. They must also be able to gain and maintain a good knowledge of the abilities of a large group of potential participants in such projects, particularly those with high levels of technological abilities. Furthermore, venture capital companies continue to add value along the way. They do this in partly by helping companies develop their business plans, products, and marketing strategies. They also do this extensively through their reputations and connections—making introductions, and attesting to quality.[13] The success of the best venture capital firms (those that capture a disproportionate share of the returns in the industry) depends far less on their ability to pick winners than on their ability to create winners. This both adds value to the firms they fund and enables them to attract the most promising firms. Given the particular difficulties of the contracting for technological information,[14] barriers to entry will be high, so individuals and firms that successfully manage such contracting should reap high rewards (a theoretical prediction readily supported by data).
  •  The effort to value technological information—assessing the market possibilities of new, perhaps recombined, technologies—is likely to be severely constrained; few skilled individuals are available to evaluate of new combinations. There will be always be many more potential new combinations of technologies—imaginable, but not tried—than there are companies and their financial supporters to try them out. The gap between potential breakthrough ideas and the number that receive a fair trial may grow in the future, as the execution of new technological combinations increasingly requires the collaboration of different actors with specialized skills.
  •  Modern technologies require the continual exchange of information and products; yet traditional markets can not accommodate such transactions.  In response, contracting is now accomplished with alternative arrangements.  The firmest ties come through a merger.  Incentives get aligned, information exchange is no longer guarded.  At the opposite extreme we see alliances, where two or more firms work together for a time, often with capabilities but not dollars changing hands.  Alliances may even be institutionalized, as they are with the Internet, where no charge is imposed by any provider to carry the information initiated by others.  Diagrams of firms’ relationships with strategic partners often have dozens or even hundreds of lines of connection.

The regional ecology of innovation: Rainforests or amber waves of grain?
Historical evidence amply documents the presence of significant knowledge spillovers and other intra-industry increasing returns to scale within regions—automobiles in Detroit, venture capital in Silicon Valley, biotechnology in the Boston metro region and carpets in North Carolina. Persuasive theoretical arguments, and some empirical evidence, support the claim that sustained regional growth requires not only the presence of specialized industry clusters, but also a certain degree of economic diversity. Barriers to entry in the field of any complementary capability will hurt the entrepreneurial industry as a whole.  Not surprisingly, the most innovative regions of the country have seen rapid entry in such fields as venture capital, or technology-oriented law firms. Countries or regions with rigid regulatory structures for investment entities will find themselves disadvantaged  way beyond what we would expect from a purely first order analysis.
Nonetheless, generalizing from the experience of particular regions is dangerous. Reason why include the following:
  • Regions vary not only in their economic structure, but also in their culture and history. Even within regions of the U.S., attitudes towards trust, reputation and risk vary significantly.
  • Ex post analyses may infer incorrectly infer causation from chance.
  •  For competing regions just as for competing firms, entering a market in which there already exists an established incumbent—e.g. a Silicon Valley—is very different from creating a new market.

[1] The National Venture Capital Association (www.nvca.org) reports that, in 1999 for example, 76 percent of venture capital investments were concentrated in four states. Within Massachusetts, for example, multiple initiatives have failed to generate economic growth based on high technology innovation in various regions outside the Boston metro. Other areas, such as the route 495 corridor, have begun to develop a regional ecology of innovation relatively spontaneously.
[2] A state with a limited technology base might reasonably do as West Virginia and Arizona have done in the fields of biometrics and optics, respectively: seek to nurture and support specific innovation/industry clusters from the ground up. However, in regions with a well developed innovation system such as that in the Boston metro area, there is a far greater reason to believe that a large scale, targeted state program would distort, rather than enhance, private incentives.
[3] Alic et al. (1992).
[4] Dertouzos, Lester and Solow (1989).
[5] Important recent contributions to this literature include Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Nordhaus (2001). Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) directly address measurement issues involved in assessing the contribution to growth of “general purpose technologies.”
[6] Such perceptions are reinforced by the astounding growth and magnitudes of venture capital disbursements—in 2000 alone exceeding $100 billion.
[7] Gompers and Lerner (1999, p. 137) note: “Demonstrating a causal relationship between innovation and job growth on the one hand and the presence of venture capital investment on the other is, however, a challenging empirical problem. To what extent are the mechanisms [of venture capital] uniquely suited to addressing the needs of entrepreneurial, high-technology firms? To what extent is venture capital just one of many financing alternatives for these firms, with its own set of strengths and limitations? This topic will reward creative researchers in the years to come.” A recent paper by Kortum and Lerner (2000) represents are rare, or possibly unique attempt to isolate the contribution of venture capital to innovation in the U.S.
[8] David Teece (1987) introduced the concept of  “complementary assets” to describe these external dependencies that govern subsequent economic success of high tech innovations. This has been expanded into the notion of the economic efficiency of social capital, Fountain (1998).
[9] This combinatorial approach to innovation has been taken up recently by Romer (1996), Weitzman (1998; see quote above), and Auerswald, Kauffman, Lobo and Shell (2000). Romer (1996: p. 204) suggests likens combinatorial innovation to the discovery of new recipes:
New growth theorists... start by dividing the world into two fundamentally different types of productive inputs that can be called “ideas” and “things.” Ideas are nonrival goods that could be stored in a bit string. Things are rival goods with mass (or energy). With ideas and things, one can explain how economic growth works. Nonrival ideas can be used to rearrange things, for example, when one follows a recipe and transforms noxious olives into tasty and healthful olive oil. Economic growth arises from the discovery of new recipes and the transformation of things from low to high value configurations.
[10] The increasing complexity of both technological and market environments pressures venture capital firms to try to develop synergies through specialization within their own domain.  Where one firm nurtures contacts in Internet advertising, another does so in biotechnology.  The specialization goes beyond expertise to the structure of the network of relationships developed by the firm.
[11] Consider, for example, the PC—for some years now a mature technology. The insides of a personal computer suggest a production process easy to decentralize and distribute among a large number of fiercely competing small firms.  Modular standards have been clearly established. Prices are falling precipitously.  Outsourcing of production is the norm. Yet, at the same time, there are dozens of new technologies appearing on the horizon that are requiring complex contracting, networks and trust. These are the new combinations—amply associated with uncertainties, informational asymmetries and unknowables—that are well suited to the venture and angel mode of support.
[12] See Somay and Teece (2000) and Tassey (2001) for a further discussion of increasing technological complexity and its implications for innovation policy.
[13] Reputations and the link to networks explains why a new MBA hired by a leading VC firm like Kleiner Perkins can generate a million dollars of business, but that same MBA forming a new firm with three peers could not expect to generate a fraction of this business.

Saturday, September 10, 2011

Resilience is Security

I wrote this in 2007. It's still my view on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks:
Illusory threats, if not recognized as such, can provoke reactions far more costly and dangerous than the threats themselves. And when leaders deliberately exaggerate threats to create fear for political purposes, the success of such adversaries is enhanced further. 
Such successes are not inevitable. Wise leaders do have the option of responding to vulnerabilities by honestly acknowledging the fact that Americans, like any other people who enjoy an open society, will always be vulnerable to terrorism and to the actions of rogue states. A responsible democratic government should act to minimize these threats, particularly when they involve potentially catastrophic outcomes, but innovation, resilience and adaptability are ultimately the most powerful tools to counter them. When political leaders and private citizens band together to cultivate technology, cut through red tape and build the capacity for response and recovery at home, lasting security may be achieved even under the shadow of persistent threats from abroad.
Full essay is here.

Thursday, September 8, 2011

Time to Bring Entrepreneurship and Innovation to the National Mall

More than a century ago an idealistic scientist gave his fortune to a country he'd never visited to create a research institute in a swamp. The scientist was James Smithson, the country the United States, and the swamp the National Mall. Smithson’s gift provided its author with an enduring legacy extending over nearly two centuries. Generations of trustees have carried out the founder’s vision of advancing "the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."  Now the time has come to update Smithson's vision for the the 21st century and create a space on the National Mall dedicated to entrepreneurship and innovation.

While the mission of the Smithsonian has remained constant, the nature of knowledge has not. At the end of the nineteenth Century the advancement of knowledge generally meant heroic discovery or patient inquiry conducted in isolation; the Smithsonian's infrastructure was accordingly designed to document and display physical artifacts related to that process. Yet in the twenty-first century, as Secretary of the Smithsonian Wayne Clough has noted, "the great issues of the day typically are interdisciplinary." Advances in knowledge increasingly require collaboration and open communication across both disciplinary and geographical boundaries. The complexity and urgency of terrestrial challenges have compelled an increase in the value placed on knowledge developed in the search for practical solutions to global challenges.

Museums today provide a bridge from past discoveries to future opportunities. Among the Smithsonian’s greatest assets is its unique ability to reach, and to touch, millions of people with inspiring and educational experiences. At their best, the Smithsonian’s programs open minds and change lives. In that spirit the Smithsonian can use its great collections and unique location to inspire its visitors to think deeply about the interaction between our planet and the life that populates it, about our major challenges, and about the astounding progress that is attainable through entrepreneurship and innovation.

At different intervals in the history of the United States, the Mall and the Smithsonian have provided us, the people of this country, with a setting for our own redefinition and reinvention. In the midst of the Great Depression, Andrew Mellon funded the creation of a National Gallery of Art, to affirm America's position as a global power. In the midst of the Cold War, the Smithsonian established the Air & Space Museum, to celebrate the trans-atmospheric supremacy that was, for a time, so critical to our national self-conception.

Now the time has come, once again, for the Mall to play a central role in the renewal of our national narrative; the time has come to establish a permanent space to recognize--in words President Obama himself spoke on the Mall in his inaugural address—"the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things--some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom." No plexiglass this time. Rather Maker Faire. Tech Shop. Fab Lab and D-Lab. Resources for brainstorming about entrepreneurial solutions to global challenges. A "Genius Bar" with the resources to start a company in an hour or less. And maybe a few robotic Pterodactyls swooping down occasionally from the high arches to pick up trash.

Remarkably, there exists an empty building on the Mall that can do this. It is a building with a history perfectly suited to celebrating entrepreneurship and innovation by all Americans and advancing America’s vital role in the 21st century as a source of entrepreneurial solutions to global challenges. Completed in 1881, the Arts & Industries building (situated directly to the East of the Smithsonian Castle) was the first building expressly built as a museum on the Mall. It was designed by renowned architect Adolf Cluss to receive the collections of the 1876 Centennial Exposition. The building was also designed to exhibit the results of research being conducted by Smithsonian scientists working in the Castle next door. But the exhibits were left largely untouched for much of the next century, changing the function of the building from celebrating the new to archiving the old. The original Arts & Industries exhibits were eventually moved, and the building closed to the public in 2004.

The first Secretary of the Smithsonian once said that "The worth and importance of the Institution is not to be estimated by what it accumulates within the walls of its building, but by what it sends forth to the world." The same can be said for the United States. Our worth in the twenty-first century will be determined by the continued efforts of the millions of entrepreneurs and innovators who daily invent a new and more promising reality for their communities, their regions, their country, and the planet we all share.

There is no progress without purpose. Identity is what we are, but initiative is what we become. A nation needs both. Let's renew our national narrative by creating at the Arts & Industries building a National Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation.



Full concept statement


twitter: @innovateonmall
web: innovationonthemall.org

What if Development Economics Was Actually About Development?

Pop quiz: Is a "business-friendly" environment the same as an "entrepreneur-friendly" environment?

Answer to that is coming up. But my guess is that 9/10 entrepreneurs get the answer right (10/10?), and 9/10 economists get it wrong.

Now as for the topic of this post, "What if Development Economics Was Actually About Development?" You might rightly ask, "What is development economics about, if not development?" Read recent books co-authored by Dean Karlan and Esther Duflo, or this volume edited by Jessica Cohen and Bill Easterly, and you will find out. "Development economics" is about improving the effectiveness of development projects. It's about enhancing the value we get from the ~$125 billion that flows each year from rich countries to poor countries to improve the lives of poor people. That's "development economics."

Development economics is mostly not about the technological and organizational transformations that are propelling the human community into an unprecedented era of increased prosperity. It is mostly not about structural changes in a $69 trillion global economy. It is mostly not about the global revolution in mobile telephony--the most ubiquitous and powerful technology people have ever created. It is mostly not about the creation and diffusion of vital standards--ISO, container shipping, TCP/IP--that have enabled global economic integration. It is mostly not about the astounding power of migration to improves lives and livelihoods. And it is mostly not about the initiative of entrepreneurs who bring imagination to opportunity to create new forms of business, products, and services that even they did not imagine could exist when they first started out.

Most of all, "development economics" is mostly not about development. That is because projects don't develop. And they don't create development. Here's a definition (thank you Dictionary.com):


de·vel·op·ment

   [dih-vel-uhp-muhnt]  Show IPA
noun
1.
the act or process of developing;  growth; progress: child development; economic development.


"Process of developing" means that there is change. A transition from one state of being to another. That is what development means. So social scientists who study development should be interested in how societies change.

Development, therefore, is a dynamic phenomenon. But the tools that define "development economics" are, overwhelmingly, static. In order for a project to be evaluated--for example with a "randomized controlled trial" (RCT)--the parameters of the project have to be strictly defined. ("Controlled" says it all). The project is a recipe. The assessment is method for determining if that recipe works in a particular place, and at a particular time.

In my last post I addressed the limitations to RCTs created by the "in a particular place" clause. (Ref. the challenge of "external validity".) But the "at a particular time" clause is even more problematic.

The point is simple: If the phenomenon under consideration is actually important to the process of development, it will, by definition, be changing. Consider just the example of mobile telephony offered above. The numbers, options, and opportunities change on an almost monthly basis. Not just superficially, but fundamentally--at the level of options, learning, and even human preferences. (Ref. "non-stationarity of the underlying process" mentioned in my last post.) But the tools of "development economics" in its current form are inherently, even assertively, static. The viability of the RCT method, in particular, depends on applying precisely the same "treatment" to each target population. If the treatment is not the same, or if important elements are omitted from the "recipe" (they will  be), then the assessment is invalid.

Is ingenious program evaluation a total waste of time? Of course not. It is a contribution...to people charged with managing projects anyway. But it is not the study of development.

I almost forgot: Is a "business-friendly" environment the same as an "entrepreneur-friendly" environment? ... Hmm. Well here is a book that is actually about development that provides some answers. More on that in my next post ;)

UPDATE: Citing this paper by Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel as an example, Dean Karlan (@deankarlan) points out to me that RCTs can be used to evaluate "a process of change that includes the decision on what to do, who does it, etc."